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PREFACE
The Chinese Students' Alliance plans to publish a series of
pamphlets before the convocation of the Washington Conference on various pertinent subjects bearing on China and
the Washington Conference. The first of the series is an
introduction to the general subject, China and the Washington
Conference, written by T. L. Wang, prize-winner of the Wah
Chang Trading Corporation Essay Contest. The second of
the series is on the Shantung Question, written by M. Joshua
Bau, which analyzes the problem from the point of view of
history and international law. The subject is brought up to
date, and includes the recent exchanges of communications
between the Chinese and Japanese Governments regarding
the terms of settlement. Pa~phlets on Tariff Automony and
Extraterritoriality will soon be ready for publication and distribution. Another pamphlet entitled "Problems Involved in
the Washington Conference," has been prepared by C. P.
Cheng, which will soon appear in the series. Other pamphlets are in preparation ; and, as soon as ready, they will be
distributed upon request.
MINGCHIEN JoSHUA BAU.

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION
The Shantung Question has become a world problem. tike
the Alsace-Lorraine controversy, which has just been settled
by the World War, it carries the potential germ of another
world conflict. As the facts of this question are well-known,
we shall not attempt to reiterate them, but shall confine our
t:ndeavors to an analysis of the problem with a view to reaching a solution, just and equitable to China and Japan.
To refresh the memory, we will recall that shortly after the
outbreak of the World War, China declared her neutrality
by a Presidential Mandate of August 6, 1914. On August 15,
1914, Japan presented an ultimatum to Germany advising
unconditional surrender of the leased territory on or before
September 15, "with a view to eventual restoration of the
same to China," and also advising the immediate withdrawal
or disarmament of all belligerent vessels within Chinese and
Japai\ese waters, asking for a reply by noon of August 23. 1
Failing to receive a reply at the appointed time, she declared
war on Germany and proceeded to attack the German leasehold of Kiaochow. Meanwhile China did not protest against
either the ultimatum or the attack, but on the contrary, intimated her intention to participate in the campaign, which,
however, was not received with favor.
During the campaign, on September 3, 1914, Japan landed
her troops at Lungkow, Shantung, outside the leased territory. On the same day, 01ina proclaimed a war zone delimiting the belligerent area to approximately one hundred
miles west of Tsingtao, including Kiaochow and Laichow, but
excluding Weihsien and Tsinan. On September 26, 1914, the
Japanese troops, marching from Lungkow to Weihsien, captured the railway station there belonging to the TsingtaoTsinan Railway, and on October 6, 1914, they seized the railway station at Tsinan, the capital of Shantung. Soon they
1. :'11illnrd, Our Eastern Question, p. 91.
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took possession of the entire line of the Tsingtao-Tsinan
Railway, displacing its employes and substituting Japanese
subjects. In addition they also seized the German mines
adjoining the railway. Meanwhile the siege of Tsingtao proceeded and on November 7, 1914, the stronghold was captured.
Thereafter, on January 18, 1915, Japan presented the now
celebrated Twenty-one Demands, among which was the provision (Group I, Article I) :
"The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to
all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the
disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which
Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in
relation to the province of Shantung." 2
On May 7, 1915, Japan presented an ultimatum, because of
which China yielded. In consequence, the treaties of May 25,
1915, were signed, consisting of two treaties, one relating to
Shantung with three exchanges of notes, and the other to
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia with nine exchanges of notes.
In return, Japan pledged to restore the leased territory of
Kiaochow, in an exchange of notes, May 25, 1915:
"When, after the termination of the present war, the
leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the
free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following
conditions.
"1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial seaport.
"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.
"3. If the foreign powers desire it, an international concession may be established.
'4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings
and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure
2. 'J'he Chino-Japanese Negotiations, the Chinese Otl'irial Statement, 1015, p. •l!l.
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relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese
Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement
before the restoration." a
Then, on March 14, 1917, China severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and on Angust 14, 1917, declared war
on Germ any and Austria-Hungary, abrogating all the treaties,
agreements, and conventions she had had with the Central
Powers, to the effect that
"All the treaties of whatever nature between China and
Germany as well as Aust'ria-Hungary are abrogated, as also
all such provisions of the Protocol of September 7, 1901,
and other similar international agreements in so far as they
concern China and Germany as well as Austria-Hungary." 4
This was duly taken notice of by the legations addressed,
including that of Japan.
On September 24, 1918, in an exchange of notes between
the Chinese Minister at Tokio and the Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs, respecting adjustment of questions concerning Shantung, it was agreed that (Art. 6) "the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway, after its ownership is definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint enterprise."
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, both China and
Japan contended for the former German rights in Shantung.
On April 30, 1919, the Council of Three rendered the decision
in favor of J apan, which was incorporated in Articles 156,
157, 158, of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at
Versailles on June 28, 1919.
The question, as stated above, tW"ns on these issues :
Whether Japan has the right
( 1) To attack the leased territory of Kiaochow;
3

Ibid, p. 53.
4. 1\I ac:\!urra~·.

•

Trestle and c\ greemenls with or Concerning
Ch in a, l!l17/ 7 .
.5. Questions for Readjustment, submllted by China to the Paris
Peace Conference, 19Hl, p. 82 .
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(2)

To land her troops at Lungkow and then march
through Chinese territory; and
(3) To seize the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the
adjoining mines.
2 Whether China's Declaration of War abrogates all treaties, conventions and agreements with Germany and
China thus recovers the German concessions in Shantung.
3 Whether Japan's possession of German rights in Shantung is validated by
( 1) The Treaty of May 25, 1915, and
(2) The Agreement of September 24, 1918.
As to whether Japan had the right to attack the leased
territory of Kiaochow, there seems to be an honest difference
of opinion. On the one hand, China claims that, inasmuch as
she reserved her sovereignty over the leased territory in
Article I of the Lease Convention,e she can assert the neutrality of the leased territory in time of a war in which the
lessee state is involved. In other words, arising from the
reservation of sovereignty, she deems the leased territory as
neutral, and not subject to the hostile operation of belligerents. Further, even in case an attack shoud have become
necessary to abate a nuisance or to remove a menace, she contends that her previous consent should have been obtained
before the attack could be legitimate.
On the other hand, Japan claims that, basing her action on
the precedent of Port Arthur and Talienwan, which leased
territories she took from Russia in the war of 1904-5, the
leased territories are not neutral, but are subject to hostile
operations of the belligerents.
The grant of the right of
fortification, she contends, and the surrender of the right of
administration, during the term of the lease, all indicate that
these territories are proper objects of attack. She further
6.

Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. J, No. G9, p. 351; Author's Chapter on Leased Territories, The Foreign Relations o! China.
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maintains that, granted she had no right to attack the territory, she had notified the Chinese Government before attack,
and that the Chinese Government did not make any strenuous objection, nor lodge any protest, but, on the contrary,
requested participation in the attack, which, though rejected,
could be taken as tantamount to tacit consent. 7
As to whether Japan had the right to land at Lungkow and
march through the Chinese territory, it is quite safe to say
that Japan had no such right, but, on the contrary, exceeded
the limit of her rights and violated the neutrality of China.
China having declared her neutrality by the Presidential
Mandate of August 6, 1914,8 Japan was under obligation to
respect her neutrality. She had no more right to move her
troops and supplies through the neutral territory of China
than Germany had in 1914 to cross the neutral territory of
Belgium in order to attack France. "It is a principle of the
law of nations that no belligerent can rightfully make use of
the territory of a neutral state for belligerent purposes, without the consent of the neutral Government." o
It has been contended by Japan that military necessity
justified the violation, inasmuch as she could attack Kiaochow more easily from the rear than from the front or the
side. This argument, however, does not seem to stand the
test of analysis. In the first place, there was no military necessity calling for such a violation of China's neutrality.
Japan could have attacked Tsingtao by landing within the
leased territory of Kiaochow, just as well as by way of Lungkow, if not better. This was witnessed by the action of the
British, who, in due respect of China's neutrality, landed at
Laoshan on September 23, and because of the shorter distance from Laoshan to Tsingtao, than from Lungkow to
Tsingtao, and fewer neutral obstacles in the way, they reached
7. '£he Shantun,~t Question, p. 40.
8 :'.1ac'llurray, 1917/ 7.
:J. Cushing, Att. Gen. 1853, 7 op. 367, cited In J. B. Moore, Vol. 7,
p. 1089
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the scene of action in time to participate in the first encounter with the Germans. 10 This action on the part of the
:British clearly proved that there was no such military necessity, and this alone, in glaring contrast with Japan's action,
is sufficient to establish the guilt of Japan.
Granting for argument sake, that there was the military
necessity, this still did not justify Japan's violation of China's
neutrality. Germany pleaded the guilt of her own violation
of Belgian neutrality on the ground of military necessity.
But the world did not condone German's crime on that account. If the violation of Belgian neutrality is unjustifiable,
as the verdict of mankind and the late World War have held
it to be so, Japan's violation of China's neutrality by landing
at Lungkow is equally unjustifiable, and, more so, because
of the absence of any ground of military necessity.
Perhaps it may be argued that China's proclamation of the
war zone, on the same day of Japan's landing at Lungkow,
fcllowing the precedent set in the Russo-Japanese War,
seemed to have given her implied consent and hence justified
Japan's action. It must be understood, however, that in proc!.aiming the war zone, China did not mean to condone Japan's
action, but rather aimed simply to protect herself from any
consequences resulting from the actions of belligerents within
her territory, so that she could be released from any charges
of negligence as a neutral. In fact, under the difficult and
embarrassing situation, the proclamation of a war zone was
probably the only course of action to pursue. For China
to resist Japan at Lungkow, in the face of force majeure,
would have meant war, which would be contrary to the spirit
of the law of neutrality. On the other hand, for China to remain silent would have been equally as inexpedient, since
Germany could then have claimed damage for injuries due
10. The Shantung Question, submitted ·bY China to the Paris
Peace Conference, published by the Chinese National Weltare
Society, March, 1920, p. 40.
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to the negligence on the part of China to preserve her neutrality. Hence, confronted with a dilemma, China was constrained to proclaim the war zone, not to extenuate Japan
but rather to protect her own position of neutrality. It is
therefore plain that notwithstanding the proclamation of the
war zone, Japan's landing at Lungkow remains a gross violation of China's neutrality.
Respecting Japan's right to seize the Kiaochow-Chinan
Railway, and the adjoining mines, it is again evident that
Japan had no such right, but, on the contrary, she did so in
violation of China's neutrality. The railway and mines in
question were situated within Chinese territory outside the
leased territory of Kiaochow, and hence they were under the
protection of Chinese authorities. No matter whether they
were the public or private property of Germans, the fact that
they lay within the Chinese territory was sufficient to clothe
them with the protection of China's neutrality and to exempt
them from seizure by any belligerent whatsoever.
In fact, Japan perpetrated the seizure in spite of the repeated protests of the Chinese Government and thus knowingly violated China's neutrality. As the war zone delimited
belligerent activities to the east of Weihsien or within one
hundred miles west of Tsingtao, and as, on September 26, the
Japanese troops proceeded to W eihsien and occupied the railway station, the Chinese Government protested on the next
day, September 27, 1914:
"On the 7th day of September a despatch received from
your Government stated that your Government understood,
with some difficulty, what our Government meant in that
declaration. This Ministry (the Chinese Foreign Office)
further declared that the railroad from Weihsien to Chinan
should be under Chinese protection, and through Your Excellency we requested your Government to issue an order
prohibiting your troops from advancing to W eihsien, or any
place west of Weihsien. But now the troops of your Government have forced their way into W eihsien and taken
possession of the railway. Considering that the railway
II

belongs to a Sino-German corporation, that all the railway
stations have also been under Chinese protection, and in
none of them has there ever been any German troops, and
that Weihsien is in the purely neutral territory; the acts
committed by the troops of your country are manifestly
contrary to the declaration and in violation of China's
neutrality." 12
Following this protest, on the next day, September 28, 1914,
the Japanese Minister at Peking called at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, to the surprise and indignation of the Chinese Government, informed the latter that,
because of military necessity, the Japanese troops would
move westward from W eihsien and occupy the whole line.
In consequence of this, on September 30, 1914, the Chinese
Government again protested :
"It is a settled principle that even the public property of
a belligerent, while on a neutral territory, can not be attacked, or taken possession of by the other belligerent, much
more so in the present case when the property in question is
jointly owned by Chinese and German capitalists. . . . It
has been a long while since the troops of your country have
begun to attack Tsingtao, and the German troops in Tsingtao have been isolated, rendered helpless, and entirely and
long ago cut off from the communication through the Kiaochow Railway. Not only our Government will never allow
the Germans to make use of the line ; it is actually beyond
their power to make use of it. Therefore the contemplated
action of your country is decidedly not a case of military
necessity"ts
In response to these repeated protests, the Japanese Government replied on October 2, 1914, that the German Kiaochow-Chinan Railway was of the same nature and character
as the leased territory and that the purpose of Japan's attack
was not only to eliminate the German base of Kiaochow, but
to gain the control and administration of the railway in ques12. Note from the \\f!ni stry of Forei gn Atl'airs to the Japanese
Minist er a t P ekin g protesting a gainst violation of neutra lity,
Sept. 27, 1014, 'l'he Sha ntung Question, op. cit., p. 58.
l."l. Ministry Clf F oreign ~~fl'alr s to Japanese Mini s ter at P eking.
Sept. 30, 1914, The Shantung Question , op. cit., p. 59.
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tion. Reiterating the argument of military necessity, it contended that, lying at the rear of the leased territory, the control of the railway was essential to the safety of Japan in
Kiaochow:
"Regarding the Shantung Railway, . . . it is of the same
character as the leased territory. This fact is beyond dispute, in view of its origin, the special charter given by the
German Government and the way in which the company
draws its funds. . . .
"Moreover, a railway from its very nature positively can
not be treated one part separately from the other. Although one part of this German-owned railway is situated
west of Weihsien, it can not be held as having changed its
character on the ground that a part remains in neutral territory. Besides, the aim of the Imperial Government is not
only to overthrow the base possessed by the enemy, but also
to cause the control and administration of this indivisible
railway to fall into our possession.

• ••

"Although the Chin~se Government holds that under the
present condition the Shantung Railway can not be utilized
by the German troops in view of its severance with China,
yet from the attacking troops' point of view, the railway
being immediately behind Tsingtao, and in view of the present situation, it is a serious danger to the military operation
to leave a railway by the enemy perfectly free." 14
It can be seen, from these extracts of the official correspondence, that what China strove for was the preservation of
her neutrality, and that what Japan aimed at was not only
the leased territory of Kiaochow, but also the KiaochowChinan Railway with the adjoining mines, though lying within
Chinese neutral territory. Such facts can not but compel a
reasonable and impartial mind to declare that Japan, in gaining control of the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the adjoining
mines, evidently violated the neutrality of China.
14. Japanese Minister at Peking to the Chinese llllnlstry of Foreig-n Afl'alrs, Oct. 2, 1914, The Shantung Qu<!stlon, Ibid .. PP159-60.
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This conclusion is all the more convincing and inescapable,
when the rules governing the inviolability of neutral territory as summarized by John Bassett Moore are taken into
consideration: 16
" . . . It appears ( 1) that the commission of hostility
against another on neutral territory is a violation of the law
of nations ; (2) that such violation involves an offense to
the neutral nation, and that reparation from the offending
belligerent is due to that nation alone; (3) that, if property
was captured, it is the duty of the offending belligerent to
restore it on the demand of the neutral; ( 4) that nations.
have, by numerous treaties, pledged themselves as neutrals
and to use 'all the means in their power' to protect or effect
the restitution of property in such cases ; but ( 5) that the
manner in which this obligation must be discharged was
not ascertained by any express rule or by any general understanding."
Applying these rules to Japan's seizure of the German
Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the adjoining mines lying
within the Chinese neutral territory outside the leased area,
it is clear that she violated China's neutrality and that in consequence she is under obligation, upon the demand of China,
to restore the same. "

Vve next come to the issue whether China's declaration of
war abrogates all the treaties of whatever nature, thus legalizing China's recovery of Germany's former concessions in
Shantung. The writers on international law are not agreed
as to whether war abrogates all treaties which pre-suppose
the continuance of peace, except those made in anticipation
of rupture. 1 6 Like Vattel, Kent contends that "as a general
rule, the obligations of treaties are dissipated by hostility,
and they are extinguished and gone forever, unless revived
by a subsequent treaty. But if a treaty contain any stipulations which contemplate a state of future war, and make
15. J". B. Moore, Internntlonnl Lnw Digest, Vol. 7, p. 1101.
16. Ibid, Vol. 5, p. 384.
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provisions for such an exigency, they preserve their force
and obligation when the rupture takes place." 1 7 On the other
hand, Fiore says: "The extinction of all treaties and conventions concluded between the belligerent states can not
be deemed au immediate effect of war, but only the termination of those which, by their nature and object, are necessarily
inconsistent with a state of war." 1s
Another reasonable doctrine is that of Calvo, which
states :19 "The sol1.1tion of these questions depends naturally
upon the particular character of the engagements contracted.
Thus all are agreed in admitting the rupture of conventional
ti es concluded expressly with a view to a state of peace, of
which special object is to promote relations of harmony between nation and nation, such as treaties of amity, of alliance, and other acts of the same nature having a political
character. As to customs and postal arrangements, conventions of navigation and commerce, and agreements relative to
private interests, they are generally considered as suspended
till the cessation of hostilities. By necessary consequence, it
is a principle that every stipulation written with reference to
war, as well as all clauses described as perpetual, (qttalifices de perpetuelles) preserve in spite of the outbreak of
hostilities their obligatory force so long as the belligerents
have not, by common accord, annulled them or replaced them
with others."
John Bassett Moore presented his own conclusion on the
subject as follows: "It is evident that . . . there was a recognition of the principle, which is now received as fundamental, that the question whether the stipulations of a treaty
are annulled by war depends upon their intrinsic character.
17. K e nt, Comm. I, 176, cited In J. B. Moore, Vol. 5, p . 385n.
18. Fiore's Internntl. Law Codified, translated by E. M. Borchard, p. 538.
l!l. Calvo, Droit Int. (4th Ed.) IV, 65, sec. 1031, cited in J. B.
Moore, Vol. 5, p. 385.
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H they relate to a right which the outbreak of war does not
annul, the treaty itself remains unannulled." 2o
Taking as our criterion the conclusion of Moore that the
question as to whether the stipulations of a treaty are annullel by war depends upon their intrinsic character, it is evident that the treaties in question are of an intrinsic character
which the war should nullify. The German lease convention
of March 6, 1898, was extorted from China by the threat
of the mailed fist. It further alienated from China her
jurisdiction over the leased territory for ninety-nine years.
In the event of war, the continuance of an alien jurisdiction
on the soil of China would be inimical to her safety, and it
is but natural, therefore, that she should avail herself of the
opportunity of war to remove that source of danger and
recovers the delegates, or rather wrested, rights of sovereignty.
Further, the lease convention granted to Germany the right
of fortification, which meant that Germany, in time of war,
could use the leased territory as a basis of action against
China. It is but plain, therefore, that such a treaty should
not be allowed to persist in time of war, but should be abrogated upon the declaration of the same. As to the TsingtaoChinan Railway and the adjoining mines, while the agreements thereon were not intrinsically of a character as not
incompatible with the status of war, their public character
and their strategic and political relations to the safety of
China warranted their being taken into custody by the territorial sovereign during the period of war, and pending the
final settlement at the peace negotiation.
It can, therefore, be fairly concluded that, inasmuch as the
declaration of war on the part of China had abrogated the
lease convention of March 6, 1898, all the German rights in
Shantung arising therefrom should have reverted to China
20 . .T . B. :\foore, Columbia Law Review, Apr. 1901, Vol. 1, No.
4, pp. 200 -223, pp. 217-8, .T. B . Moore, Int'natl. Lnw Dla-.,
Vol. 5, p. 383.
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automatically, and that Japan's possession of them from that
moment on was in defiance and contravention of China's
rights. It can also be affirmed that the Kiaochow-Tsingtao
Railway and the adjoining mines should have come Into the
custody and possession of China upon her declaration of war,
and that Japan's control and possession of the same was not
only consummated in violation of China's neutrality, but also
retained in defiance and contravention of China's rights.

1

We now come to the third issue whether Japan's possession
of the German rights in Shantung is validated by the Treaty
pf May 25, 1915, and the Agreement of September 24, 1918.
As regards the consent which Japan exacted from China by
virtue of Article I of the Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting
Sbantung, 21 it must be observed that the assent, as provided
therein, conceding for argument sake its validity, which is
contested, is not applicable to the final settlement at the Paris
Peace Conference. For the negotioation was not between
Germany and Japan as stipulated in the provision, but between the Allied and associated Powers on the one hand and
Germany on the other. Hence, inasmuch as Japan was "debarred from negotiating separately with Germany in respect
to the latter's system in Shantung owing to the decision of
the Conference to deal with German territories and concessions without consulting Germany," it is evident that Japan
did not comply with the provision of coming to an agreement
with Germany regarding the free disposal of Kiaochow and
that "the article in question should be deemed inoperativve." 2 2
Granting, however, for argument's sake, that the settlement
as reached at the Paris Peace Conference came within the
scope of the provision, it is to be claimed that the consent
was not given of China's free will, but rather was exacted
under the duress of the ultimatum of May 7, 1915, and the
21. The Chino-Japanese Ne;;otiatlons, op. cit.
'l'reuty ot 1915 respecting Shantung.
22. The Shantung Question, pp. 17-18.
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p.

40, Art. 1.

demonstration of naval and military forces accompanying it.
While international law recognizes the validity of treaties
:mposed, even under coercion, by the victorious states upon
the vanquished, it is, nevertheless, not within reason to believe that international law recognizes the validity of treaties
imposed by one friendly nation upon another, while in the
relation of peace and amity. It is true that "coercion, while
invalidating a contract produced by it, does not invalidate a
treaty so produced. Thus there can be no question of the
binding force of the treaty which followed the FrenchGerman War which led to the dethronement of Napoleon III,
though its terms were assented to under coercion. The same
may be said of the consent of France in the settlement enforced by the allies after Waterloo, and so of the treaty by
which Mexico ceded California and the adjacent territory
to the United States." 23 It is, nevertheless, to be noted that
what is recognized by international law is the validity of
treaties made in consequence of war though imposed necessarily by the victor on the vanquished under duress, and that
it is not conceivable that international law, postulating as it
does the fundamental principles of territorial sovereignty and
the equality and independence of states, will countenance
and give validity to an agreement or treaty, the consent to
which was exacted from a friendly nation in time of peace,
and this in consequence of the violation of the latter's neutrality. Fiore says, while admitting the validity of treaties
imposed by victorious states upon defeated in consequence
of war, •'treaties concluded between states must be freely
assented to. Assent is not valid if given by mistake, extorted by violence or obtained by fraud." 2 4
The official statement given out by the Chinese Government
regarding the Chino-Japanese negotiations of 1915 clearly
proves that China's consent relating to the disposal of the
23. J". B. Moore, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 183.
24. Flore's lnt'natl. Law Cocllficd, op . cit, p. 332.
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German rights in Shantung was not freely and fully given,
but was exacted under the duress of the ultimatum of May 7,
1915. The statement records that on February 2, 1915, at the
first conference, while she consented in principle to Article 1
relating to the disposal of the German rights in Shantung,
China nevertheless made certain counter-proposals as conditions to the grant of her consent, namely, Japan's pledge to
restore Kiaochow, China's right to be represented at the
negotiations between Japan and Germany when dealing with
the disposal of Kiaochow, the indemnification of Chinars
losses due to Japan's operations within the Chinese territory, the restoration of the control of the Maritime Customs,
the telegraph and the post-offices in the possession of Japan,
the removal of the Japanese military railway and telegraph
lines and the withdrawal of Japanese troops.25
Again, China's reply of May 1, 1915, to Japan's revised
demands of April 26, 1915, while giving her cgnsent to any
settlement that Japan might reach with Germany at the conclusion of the war, the Chinese Government specifically inserted two provisions calculated to preserve the sovereignty
of China in Shantung and the leased territory and to act as
conditions to the grant of the consent in question: 2 5•
"The Japanese Government declares that when the
Chinese Government give their assent to the disposition of
interests above referred to, Japan will restore the leased
territory of Kiaochow to China; and further recognize the
right of the Chinese Government to participate in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany.
"The Japanese Government consent to be responsible for
the indemnification of all losses occasioned by Japan's military operation around the leased territory of Kiaochow.
The customs, telegraphs and postoffices within the leased
territory of Kiaochow shall, prior to the restoration of the
said leased territory to China, be administered as heretofore for the time being. The railways and telegraph lines
25. The Chino-Japanese Negotiations, op. cit., p.4-5.
25a Ibid, p. 35.
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erected by Japan for military purposes are to be removed
forthwith. The Japanese troops now stationed outside
the original leased territory of Kiaochow are now to be
withdrawn first, those within the original leased territory
are to be withdrawn on the restoration of the said leased
territory to China."
Japan's ultimatum of May 7, 1915, contains a reference
to these conditions as set forth by China which proves
beyond doubt that, except for the duress or coercion of the
ultimatum, China would not have consented to Japan's settlement with Germany regarding the disposal of the German
rights in Shantung at the conclusion of the war, and that
it was the duress exerted by the ultimatum that caused the
Chinese Government to relinquish the proposed conditions
and to accept Japan's formula for the consent without any
qualification. The ultimatum ran in part as follows ;26
"Furthermore, the Chinese Government not only ignored
the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government in offering
the restoration of Kiaochow Bay, but also in replying to
the revised proposals they even demanded its unconditional restoration ; and again China demanded that Japan
should bear the responsibility of paying indemnity for all
the unavoidable losses and damages resulting from Japan's
military operations at Kiaochow; and still further in connection with the territory of Kiaochow China advanced
other demands and declared that she has the right of participation at the future Peace Conference to be held between Japan and Germany. Although China is fully aware
that the unconditional restoration of Kiaochow and Japan's
responsibility of indemnification for the unaovidable losses
and damages can never be tolerated by Japan, yet she purposely advanced these demands and declared that their reply
was final and decisive."
It can therefore be safely said that, except for the duress
of the ultimatum with the accompanying demonstration of
force,2' China would not have given up these conditions and
26. Ibid pp . 40·41.
27. Hearings before the Committee on For. R ei., U. S. Sen., 66
Cong. let Ses. Sen. Document No . 106 on Treaty or Peace
w lth Germany signed at Versallles on June 28, 1919, pp. 561
to 562, testimony or Mr. Ferguson.
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that it was the coercion-and coercion applied to a friendly
nation while in the relations of peace and amity,-that extorted the consent. It is also obviously in accordance with
the spirit of international law to maintain that such a consent
obtained under duress or coercion should invalidate Japan's
possession of the former German rights in Shantung.
Adverting to whether the agreement of September 24,
1918, validates Japan's control over the Kiaochow-Chinan
Railway, Article 6 of which provides:
"The Kiaochow-Chinan Railway, after its ownership is
definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint
enterprise,"
and Article 4 of which stipulates:
"Japanese are to be employed at the headquarters of the
above mentioned police force at the principal railway stations and at the police training school," 2s
the opinion must be expressed that in view of the illegal
consideration for which the agreement was made, the agreement in question can not forestall China's claims to her own
rights and validate Japan's possession of the German rights in
Shantung. While it is true that "a consideration is essential
to give effect to a contract, but it is possible to conceive of a
treaty which has no consideration," 29 it is, nevertheless, reasonable to believe that international law, upholding as it does
the fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty, will not
be prone to countenance the validity of a treaty, which was
exacted on the basis of an illegal consideration arising out
of the violation of the fundamental principle of territorial
sovereignty. For the Agreement of September 24, 1918, was
concluded on the part of China to induce the withdrawal of
Japan's civil administration established in Shantung in violation of China's sovereignty. It is an accepted principle that
civil administration proceeds out of, and usually follows, mili28. The Shantung Question, pp. 67-68.
29. J. B. Moore, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 183.
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tary occupation, but, in this particular case, the military occupation was accomplished in violation of China's neutrality
and sovereignty as shown above, and hence the civil administration proceeding out of, and following, an illegal military
occupation can not but be illegitimate.
The official Chinese claims at the Paris Peace Conference
recorded:
"Under an imperial ordinance No. 175 of October 1, 1917,
the Japanese Government established a Civil Administration
at Tsingtao with branches at Fantze, Chantien, and Chinan,
and of which three cities are situated along the railway
outside of the leased territory, and of the fifty kilometre
zone. . . . The Fantze branch of the Japanese Civil
Administration has even asserted jurisdiction in lawsuits
between Chinese and has levied taxes on them. . . .Hso
It was because of this illegal establishment of civil administration in consequence of a military occupation done in
violation of China's neutrality and sovereignty, and the consequent indignation of the Chinese, especially the Shantung
people, that the Chinese Government was constrained to agree
with Japan for the Chino-Japanese joint administration of
the Kiaochow Railway and the Japanese supervision of the
railway police thereof in exchange for the withdrawal of
Japan's civil administration.s 1 ,S 2 Hence, inasmuch as the
consideration for which the agreement was made was illegal
and in fact in direct violation of China's territorial sovereignty, the agreement of September Z4, 1918, can not validate Japan's control over the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway. Or
else Japan's violation of China's neutrality and sovereignty,
instead of being discouraged by proper penalties, would be
encouraged and condoned by substantial rewards which is
contrary to the spirit of international law.ss
30. The Shantung Question, p. 42.
31. Ibid, p. 42.
32. Cf. Statements by the Chinese Pence Delegation, May S, 1919,
Millard's Review Supp. July 17, 1920, p . 10.
33. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 444-5, Mr. T. F. Millard's testimony.
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It may be argued that, in connection with the agreement,
on the same date, an advance of twenty million yen was
made for the construction of the Chinan-Shunteh and KaomiHsuchow Railways and that another advance of a similar
amount was made for the construction of four railways in
Manchuria and Mongolia; hence China was estopped from
making any objection to the agreement of September 24, 1918,
respecting the Kiachow-Chinan Railway. It is true that on
the same date two other separate and independent agreements were signed for the construction of the above-mentioned railways, and it is also true that the Chinese Government received a total advance of forty million yen. As far
as the two agreements are concerned regarding the construction of the railways in question, they may stand valid. It Is,
nevertheless, to be noted that the agreement of September
24, 1918, respecting the control of the Kiaochow Railway,
was entirely separate and independent from the other two,
and was made not in consideration of the two advances of
twenty million yen each, nor for the consideration of Japan's
construction of the two railways in Shantung and the four
railways in Manchuria and Mongolia, buf rather in consideration of the withdrawal of Japan's civil administration and
Japanese troops along the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway (except
a contingent at Chinan), which, as we have seen, was illegal.
The only fact in common between this illegal agreement
and the other agreements for which the two advances
had been received was that they were concluded and signed
on the same day of September 24, 1918. Beyond this, there
was no relation between these agreements.a 4 Hence, inasmuch as the two advances of twenty million yen each were
made in connection with the other agreements, that of September 24, 1918, respecting the control of the KiaochowChinan Railway, still remains invalid and therefore does not
34. For th e t ext of the agreement, see The Shantung Question,
op. cit., pp . 66-70.
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confer upon Japan any title or right of possession and control
with respect to the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway.
Summarizing the conclusions we have so far reached relating to the issues of the Shantung question, it can be said
that, while admitting the ground for an honest difference of
opinion relative to her right to attack Kiaochow, Japan had
nc right to land her troops at Lungkow and march through
Chinese neutral territory and seize the German KiaochowChinan Railway and the adjoining mines, in violation of
China's neutrality and sovereignty; that China's declaration
of war did abrogate the lease convention of March 6, 1898,
and thus automatically regained the former German concessions arising out of the convention and entitled her to the
custody and possession of the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and
the adjoining mines, pending the final settlement at the Peace
negotiation ; and that Japan's possession of the German rights
in Shantung was not validated by the consent relative to Japan's settlement with Germany as to the disposal of the German
rights in Shantung as embodied in Article I of the Treaty
of May 25, 1915, respecting the Province of Shantung, which
consent, as we have seen, was extorted under the duress of
an ultimatum ; nor was it justified by the Agreement of September 24, 1918, respecting adjustment of questions concerning Shantung, which, as we recall, was contracted for an
illegal consideration, that is, the withdrawal of Japanese
troops from the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and of the Japanese civil administration from Shantung, both of which were
illegally established. In view of these conclusions, we can
not but be constrained to reach the conclusion that Japan
has held the leased territory of Kiaochow as against the rights
of China since China's declaration of war on August 24, 1917,
and that she has acquired the German rights in the KiaochowChinan Railway and the adjoining mines in violation of
China's neutrality and sovereignty and in defiance of her
repeated protests. Hence, Japan is under legal and moral
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obligation to return to China the leased territory of Kiaochow and to place in the custody and possession of the
Chinese G~v~r~1men~ the German Kiaochow-Chinan Railway
and the ad)ommg mmes, subject possibly to proper compensation for Japan's service in the capture of the leased territory.
In view of these conclusions, we affirm that the Shantung
decision as rendered at the Paris Peace Conference by the
Council of Three on April 30, 1919, was unjust. The Council
awarded Japan all the German rights in Shantung, and, in
addition, the right to officer the railway police along the
Kiaochow-Chinan Railway, and to establish a permanent concession in Tsingtao.
Articles 156, 157, 158, of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, embodying this decision, read:
"Germany renounces, in favor of Japan, all her rights,
titles and privileges-particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cableswhich she acquired in virtue of the treaty concluded by her
with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.
"All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway,
including its branch lines together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock,
mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines,
are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights
and privileges, attaching thereto.
"The German state submarine cables from Tsingtao to
Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights,
privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly
acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and encumbrances. (Art. 156.)
"The movable and immovable property owned by the
German state in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all
the rights which Germany might claim in consequen.ce of
the works or improvements made or of the expenses mcurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this
territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear
of all charges and encumbrances. (Art. 157.)
"Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months

from the coming into force of the present treaty the
archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of
every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other,
of the territory of Kiaochow.
"Within the same period Germany shall gtve particulars to
Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating
to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two
preceding articles." (Art. 168.)
It will be seen that the rights conferred upon Japan were
not those belonging to Germany, but those legitimately belonging to China, as we hold that the German rights had automatically reverted to China upon the declaration of war on August
14, 1917. 8 ~ Hence, the Council of Three has awarded to
Japan the rights, not of Germany, but of China,-not of an
enemy, but of an ally or associate in the war. As the Chinese
Peace Delegation at Paris put it: "It appears clear that the
Council has been bestowing to Japan rights, not of Germany,
but of China, not of the enemy but of an ally. A more
powerful ally has reaped benefits at the expense, not of the
common enemy, but of a weaker ally." sa
What is worse, the Council of Three has awarded these
legitimate rights of China, to Japan-a state that has perpetrated the crime of the violation of China's neutrality and
sovereignty. Instead of requiring the offending state to restore the former German rights to the rightful sovereign
owner, which should be the dictates of reason and conscience, the Council condoned and encouraged Japan's conduct
by awarding her the German rights in Shantung. The inconsistency is all the more glaring, when it is seen that, in the
ca5e of Germany, her violation of Belgian neutrality was so
severely condemned and penalized, but in the case of Japan,
for her violation of China's neutrality, especially in view of
35. This declaration was oll'icially presented to, and taken cognizance or, by the Allied and Associated Governments-the
statement by the Chinese Peace Delegation, .May 3, 1919, Millard's Review, Supp., July 17, 1920, p. 19.
86. Statement by the Chinese Peace Delegation. Ibid.

the absence of any ground of military necessity, she was not
only penalized, but on the contrary, awarded the rights, not
of Germany, but of China,-a friendly ally and loyal associate in the war.s 7
It may, however, be contended, that, unjust as the Shantung decision might be, the Allied Powers were bound by the
secret agreements of February and March, 1917, to award
the German rights in Shantung to Japan.as It must, nevertheless, be observed that these secret agreements were made
prior to the acceptance of Wilson's peace terms as set
forth in his address to the United States Congress on June
8, 1918, and in his subsequent speeches, and hence, were abrogated by the subsequent acceptance of Wilson's principles
of peace.
To this effect the testimony was put on record
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
". . . On looking over the addresses of President Wilson and the statement made by Secretary Lansing to the
German Government with regard to the bases of peace, I
found this (reading) :
" 'The unqualified acceptance by the present German
Government and by a large majority of the German
Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of
the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918,
and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President
in making a frank and direct statement of his decision
with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918.'
"Now as to the subsequent addresses, although there is
nothing directly bearing upon the question of the 14 points
mentioned in the address of January 18, one of the subsequent addresses was that on the 4th of July at Washington's
Tomb at Mount Vernon in which he said:
37. It should be further observed that inasmuch as the Klaochow lease convention stipulated that Germany should engage not to sublet the leasehold to any other state, the
Shantung decision violated the sanctity ot this treaty obligation.
38. For the secret agreements, see Mlllnrd'a Review supp. Jul;v
17, 1920, pp. 1-3.

"'No half-way decision is conceivable.
These are the
ends for which the associated peoples of the world are
fighting and which must be conceded them before there
can be peace.'
"Then he mentions, one, 'the destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere, and so on, and two is the one to
which I want to call attention. (Reading:)
" 'The settlement of every question, whether of territory,
of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political
relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that
settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not
upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of
any other nation or people which may desire a different
settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or
mastery.'
"I think it was in this memorandum to the President that
I mentioned this point. I can not say positively that it
was in that or some other connection that I called attention
to this statement and said that my understanding was that
all the powers who entered into the agreement for the
negotiation of peace after the armistice of November 11
practically accepted the bases of peace as laid down by the
American Government and that this was one of the bases
of peace, and that no exception, no reservation, had been
made to this by any of the powers, by Great Britain,
France, or Japan, although Great Britain did make reservations with regard to some other things, and that therefore it seemed to me that any prior arrangement such as
these secret treaties between Great Britain and Japan and
between France and Japan ought not to be held any longer
in force because they were really abrogated by the acceptance of these bases of peace."ao
It may be further contended that the Shantung decision in
favor of Japan was necessary to prevent Japan's leaving
the Paris Peace Conference and thus to save the League of
Nations just on the eve of formation. In fact, that was the
opinion of Wilson, and probably the real reason for his decision.•0 It must, however, be considered that the fear of
39. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 622 to 623, the testi-mony o! Professor
FJ. T. Williams.
40. Ct. Hearings, Conference at White House, Aug. 19, 1919, pp.
531-2.

Japan's withdrawal from the Conference or refusal to sign
the Treaty was not well founded. It is unlikely that Japan
would exclude herself from the League for the loss of the
former German rights in Shantung. Secretary Lansing testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that
he believed Japan would have signed the Treaty even though
the decision should have been against her, the main consideration being membership in the League : 41
"Senator Johnson of California: Would the Japanese
signatures to the League of Nations have been obtained if
you had not made the Shantung agreement?
"Secretary Lansing: I think so.
"Senator Johnson of California: You do?
"Secretary Lansing: I think so.
"Senator Johnson of California: So that even though
Shantung had not been delivered to Japan, the League of
Nations would not have been injured?
"Secretary Lansing: I do not think so.
"Senator Johnson of California: And you would have
had the same signatories that you have now?
"Secretary Lansing: Yes; one more, China.
"Senator Johnson of California: One more, China. So
that the result of the Shantung decision was simply to lose
China's signature rather than to gain Japan's?
"Secretary Lansing: That is my personal view, but I may
be wrong about it."
Granted for argument's sake that there was real danger
of Japan's leaving the Conference or refusing to become a
member of the League, it is manifest that the decision was
rendered on the ground of expediency rather than that of
intrinsic justice. While it is admitted that expediency, when
not involving questions of morality, may become a guiding
principle of statesmanship, it must be maintained, nevertheless, that when moral issues are involved, expediency must
be subordinated to morality. In other words, in life as well
as in statesmanship, morality must reign supreme, notwithstanding considerations of expediency.
H. Hearings, Senate Doc., No. 106, op. cit., p. 182.

Passing from the injustice of the Shantung decision, we
now come to consider Japan's policy in relation to Shantung.
In the statement of Wilson, August 6, 1919,42 the policy of
Japan relative to Shantung was said to be as follows :
"The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung
Peninsula in fu11 sovereignty to China, retaining only the
economic privileges granted to Germany, and the right to
establiSh a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsintao.
"The owners of the railway will use special police only
to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no
other purpose.
"The police force will be composed of Chinese, and such
Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway may
select will be appointed by the Chinese Government."
Taking this as the policy of Japan, it will be noticed that
Japan presumed to have in her possession the sovereignty of
Shantung which she had in no way acquired, and which was
expressly reserved in the lease convention of March 6, 1898.
Whatever sovereignty is now in her possession must have
been acquired in violation of China's neutrality and sovereignty. And yet 'Japan pledges to return Shantung to Chin&
in fu11 sovereignty. That is, Japan proposes to return something to China which by right is not hers but China's.
Probably what she meant by the sovereignty of Shantung
is the leased territory of Kiaochow, which she proposed to
return, and, in fact, pledged to do so. If so, then, as we
have seen, inasmuch as China's declaration of war, on August
14, 1917, abrogated the lease convention of March 6, 1898,
and hence recovered to herself the rights of the leased territory, Japan is proposing to return something to China which
by right belongs to China and which Japan has held, ever
~ince the day of China's declaration of war, in contravention
of the sovereign rights of China.
It wi11 be further noticed that the second part of Japan's
42. N. ¥. Tlmes, Aug. 7, 1919; Millard's Review, Supp, J"uly 17,
1920, P. 16; also see Cbas. B. llllliott, The Shantung Question,
Amerlcan J"ournal of Internatl. Law, Vol. 13, 1919, pp. 728.
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policy is to retain all German economic concessions in Shantung, including the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the adJOmmg mines. It is needless to point out again that these
economic concessions have been seized and retained by Japan
in violation of China's neutrality and in defiance of China's
repeated protests, and that since China's declaration of war
they should have been in the custody and possession of
China, pending final settlement with Germany at the Peace
negotiation, and that Japan is under moral and legal obligations to restore the same to China. And yet Japan proposes
to retain these ill-gotten concessions.
Again, Japan plans to establish a railway police along the
Kiaochow-Chinan Railway officered by the Japanese though
manned by the Chinese, basing her right to do so on the
Agreement of September 24, 1918, respecting adjustment of
questions concerning Shantung. As has been already shown,
the agreement in question is void or voidable, because of its
illegal consideration. Besides, the right of police is in excess
of the former German rights in Shantung. In the agreement
of March 21, 1900, respecting the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway
regulations,43 it was specifically stipulated (Art. 16) :
"If troops are needed, outside of the hundred 1i (50 kilometres) zone, they shall be despatched by the Governor of
the Province of Shantung. No foreign troops may be employed for this purpose."
In the subsequent convention of November 28, 1905,*' Germany engaged to withdraw her troops from Kiaochow and
Kaomi to Tsingtao (Arts. 1 and 2) ; and to leave the neutral
zone and railway to the police of the Chinese Government.
Hence, in view of the limitations of the German rights in
Shantung, Japan's claim to establish railway police along
the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway is in excess of the German
rights and in violation of China's sovereignty.
43. The Shantung Question. pp. 50·54 .
44. Ibid pp. 54·56.
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The political significance of the Shantung question can not
be overestimated. This question represents the historic issue
of the struggle between the Chinese nation and the foreign
powers, the issue of territorial sovereignty. Ever since her
opening, China was confronted with the greatest problem
of all her history-that is, how to preserve her territorial
integrity and political independence in the face of foreign
aggression. She attempted to solve this great problem by.
the Boxer Uprising in 1900, which only plunged her into the
depths of humiliation. Failing in this, she brought to pass
the Chinese Revolution of 1911, aiming to take hold of the
reins of government and thus to establish a strong and stable
government for her own protection. Now this Shantung
question represents foreign aggression or encroachment on
the territorial sovereignty of China, which she aims to uphold under the aegis of the Republic. Hence, in resisting
Japan's aggression in Shantung, China is simply following
the tradition of her historical development. To win in the
Shantung question is to succeed in the assertion and maintenance of her territorial sovereignty. To fail is to acknowledge servitude. Hence, the Shantung question will become
the battle cry of Chinese nationalism, and hence the Chinese
people, determined as they are to preserve their territory
and sovereignty, will never yield in the Shantung affair.
Again ,this question represents the conflict of Japan's policies in China and China's policy for herself. As we recall,
Japan aims to exploit the natural resources of China, and to
e~tablish her position of paramount influence. She also aims
to control and dominate China-by strengthening her influence around and in Peking through her dominance in Manchuria and Shantung. On the other hand, China strives for
self-preservation-for her independence and sovereignty. She
aims to preserve what she has, and in addition, to recover
her lost or delegated rights of sovereignty. Hence the Shantung question represents the conflict of the policiczs of the
two nations.

Further, the Shantung question involves the sanctity o£
international law, the maintenance of which constituted one of
the objects of the World War. It raises the question as to
whether the nations are to observe the principles of international law, or are to relapse into anarchy. If they mean
to uphold the sanctity of international law, they must right
the wrong done in the Shantung decision. Hence, the suecessful and .right solution of the Shantung question means
the vindication of the sanctity of international law.
Finally, the Shantung question represents the moral issue
of might versus right. By virtue of her military and naval
forces, Japan has acquired the German rights in Shantung
in evident violation of China's neutrality and sovereignty.
On the other hand, because of the insufficient backing of
force, China has failed to recover the rights which should
have pr01Jerly belonged to her. If Japan wins eventually
in the Shantung question, it means an unfortunate reaffirmation of the principle of "Might makes right." On the other
hand, if China wins, it is a successful vindication of the principle of "Right makes might"
As to remedies for the Shantung question, there are only
three. First, Japan may change her policy and thus the
Shantung question may be successfully solved. But this is
scarcely ex pected, at least in the immediate future. She will
stand by the agreement of September 24, 1918, and the Treaty
of May 25, 1915, or still better, the original Twenty-one
Demands. She will also stand by the Shantung decision as
embodied in Articles 156, 157, 158, of the Treaty of Peace
with Germany, which gives a legal sanction to her position
in Shantung. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, in
the absence of other adequate remedies, Japan will not likely
yield in th e Shantung question in any substantial way, unless
and until she changes her policy toward China as a whole.
The second remedy is the League of Nations, or Conference
of Powers. Will the League or Conference reconsider the
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question and right the wrong of the Shantung decision?
That is the question which few will dare to answer. Be it
as it may, it is within reason to believe, however, that the
League or Washington Conference will have to take into consideration the pride and honor of Japan, for the maintenance
of which Japan will do all in her power to prevent a reconsideration of the question. It is also reasonable to expect
that in case of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
unless Great Britain is released from obligation, she will be
obligated to support Japan in the Conference or in the Councii and the Assembly, which means that, in the case of the
League, China can not get a unanimous report or recommendation from the Council or a report or recommendation
from the Assembly concurred in by all the members represented in the Council and a majority of the other members,
exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute, which is
requisite to give the report or recommendation the sanction
of the League, in case one party chooses to comply therewith.
The third remedy is that China should become strong herself, and thus cause Japan to respect her rights. This seems
to be the shortest as well as the noblest way, to a solution
of the question. For Japan's action in Shantung is based on
the inability of China to uphold her rights. As soon as
Japan sees that China is able to do so, rather than run the
gauntlet of a conflict with her, Japan will yield. Further,
Japan's policies toward China, it will be remembered, are
partly founded on China's weakness. The minute China becomes strong, the raisetl d'etre of some of Japan's policies
will be eliminated, and she will surely change her attitude and
policy, in consequence. Hence, in the absence of a voluntary
change of policy on the part of Japan and adequate action
by the League of Nations or the Washington Conference, the
remedy will lie in the rise of a strong China.
The basis of solution of the Shantung question is simple.
Giving due recognition to Japan's service and sacrifice in
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the capture of Kiaochow, and paying due regard to the
sovereignty of China, the principle of the solution should be,
on the one hand, that as a recompense for her service and
sacrifice, Japan should be entitled to some form of compensation; and, on the other, that, in full recognition of China's
sovereignty, Japan should restore to China all German concessions in Shantung, including the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway, the adjoining mines, and the leased territory, subject,
however, to the proviso that these concessions should not be
mortgaged or alienated by China in any way to any other
foreign power. Thus Japan would receive her due share of
compensation and China would maintain her territorial sovereignty and recover her rights.
After the foregoing was written, the Shantung Question
entered upon a new stage of development, which deserves our
attention. On September 7, 1921, the Japanese Government
submitted to the Chinese Government nine proposals as the
terms of settlement for the dispute. 46 On October 5, 1921, the
4li. Sen. Hearings, Sen. D~c. No. 106, op. cit., p. 561, the
testimony of Mr. Ferguson.
46. Copy furnished by the Chicago Daily News, dispatch by the
Assoc!a ted Press.
(1) The leasehold of K!ao Cha u and the rights originally
g ranted to Germany with regard to the 1lfty k!lometre zone
around the Kino Chau Bay shall be restored to China.
(2) The Japanese government will abandon plans for the
establishment of a Japanese exclusive settlement or of an oPen
International settlement In Tsing Tao: Provided that China
engages to open of Its own accord the entire leased territory or Kino Chou as a port of trade and to permit the
nationals of all foreign countries freely to reside and to
carry on commerce, industry, agriculture or any other lawful
pursuits within such territory, and that she further undertakes to respect the vested rights of all foreigners. China
shall likewise carry out forthwith the opening ot suitable
cities and towns within the province of Shantung tor residence and trade of the nationals ot all foreign countries.
Itegulntlons for the opening of places under the foregoing
clau ses s'hall be determined by the Chinese Government upon
consultation wlth the powers interested.
(3) The Kiao Chou-Tslnantu railway and all mines appur-

35

Chinese Government made the reply, 4 ' in general rejecting
the proposals.
In the first proposal, the leasehold of Kiaochow and the
rights originally granted to Germany with regard to the
tenant thereto shall be worked as a joint Slno·Japanese enterprise.
(4) Japan wlll renounce all preferential rights with regard to foreign assistance in Persons, capital and material,
stipulated In the Sino -German Treaty of M•arch 6, 1898.
(5) 'Rights relating to the extensions of the Klao ChouTslnanfu railway, as well as options for the construction of
the Yentai-Welbsien railway w1ll be thrown open for the
<'omm on activity of the lnternationnl fin a ncial con sortium In
Chinn.
(6) The status of the custom house at Tslngtao as forming
an Integral part of the general customs system of China shall
be made clearer than under the German regime.
(7) Public property used for administrative purposes within
the leased terri tory of Klao Chou will, In general, be trans ferred to China; It bein&- understood that the maintenance
and operation of public works and establishments shall be
arranged between the Japanese and Chinese Governments.
(8) With a view to arranging detailed plans for carrying
Into eft'ect the terms of settlement above Indicated and for the
purpose ot adjusting other matters not embodied therein, the
Japanese and Chinese Governments shall appoint their representative commissioners as soon as possible.
(9) The Japanese Government have on more than one occasion declared willingness to proceed to the recall of Japanese
troops now stationed along the Kino Chou -Tslnanfu Railway
upon organization by China of a police force to assume
protection of the railway. As soon as the Chinese Government shall have organized such a pollee force and notified
the Japanese Government to that effect, Japanese troops
will be ordered to hand over to the Chinese pollee the cbarge
of the railway protection, and thereupon Immediately to
withdraw. It Is, however, to be understood that the question
of the organlza tlon of a special pollee guarding the Kino
Cbou -Tslnanfu railway shall be reserved for future consid eration between Japan and China.
47. Copy furnished by the Chinese J>egatlon, Washing ton, D. C.
With reference to the Important Shantung Question which Is
now pending he tween China and Japan . China bas Indeed
been most desirous of an early settlement for the restitution of her sovereign rights 11nd territory. The reason why
China bas not until now been able to commence negotiations
with Japan Is because of the fact that the basis upon which
Japan claims to negotiate are all of a nature either highly
objectionable to the Chinese G{)vernment and the Chinese
people, or such to which they have never given their recognition. Furthermore, In regard to the Shantung Question,
although Japan has made many vague declarations she has

fifty kilometer zone were to be restored to China. This is
simply a reiteration of the pledge of restoration made in the
exchange of notes, May 25, 1915. In the eyes of the Chinese,
this proposal carries no more weight than one to restore to
China what by rights belongs to her. For China regards the
leasehold of Kiaochow as having been abrogated by her declaration of war against Germany on August 14, 1915, and
as one which should have reverted to her possession on that
date. Hence the reply :
"The lease of Kiao Chou expired immediately on China's
declaration of war against Germany. Now that Japan is
only in military occupation of the leased territory the latter
in fact had no plan which Is fundamentally accpetable. There·
fore the case has been pending for many yeats much to t·he
unexpectatlon of China. On September 7 Japan submitted
certain proposals for the readjustment of the Shantung Question In the form of a memorandum together with a verbal
statement by the Japanese Minister to the effect that in view
or the great principle of Sino-Japanese friendship Japan hae
decided unon this fair and just plan as her final concession,
etc. After careful consideration the Chinese Government feels
that much In Japan's new proposals Is still Incompatible
with the repeated declarations of the Chinese Government,
with the hopes and expectations ot the entire Chinese P.eople,
and with the principles laid down In treaties between China
and tbe foreign powers. If these proposals are to be consid·
ered the final concession on the part of Japan, they surely
fall short to prove the sincerity of Japan's desire to settle
the question. For instance:
(1) The lease of Klaochow expired Immediately on China's
declaration or war against Germany. Now that Japan Is
only In mllltary occupation of the lensed territory the latter
should be wholly returned to China without conditione.
There can be no question of any leasehold.
(2) As to the opening of Klaochow Bay as a commercial
port for the convenience of trade and residence of the nationals of all friendly powers, China has already on previous
occasions communicated her intentions to do so to the powers, and there can be no necessity for the establls'hment of
any purely foreign settlement ~gain. A!!!rlcultural pursuits
concern the fundamental means of existence of the people
of a country; and according to the usual practice of all
countries, no foreigners are permitted to engage In them.
The vestecl rights of foreigners obtained tl)rou~~:h lawful
processes under fhe German Regime shall of course be respected but thoEe obtained by force ~nd compulsion durin!!!
the period of Japanese military occupation and against law
ancl treaties can In no wise be recognized. And again al-
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should be wholly returned to China without conditions.
There can be no question of any leasehold."
The second proposal offered to surrender the claim to an
exclusive Japanese settlement or an international concession
in Tsing Tao as was stipulated in the exchange of notes, May
25, 1915. This abandonment, however, was to be made on
conditions that would safeguard the economic interests of
the Japanese and other foreigners. First, China was to "open
cf its own accord the entire leased territory of Kiaochow as
a port of trade," which was also a reiteration of a stipulation in the exchange of notes, May 25, 1915. Second, China
was "to permit the nationals of all foreign countries freely to
though this same article in advocating the opening of cities
and towns of Shantung as commercial ports agrees with
China's intention and desire of developing commerce, the
opening of such places should nevertheless be left to China·s
own judgment ami selection In accordance with circumstnnces. As to the regulations governing the opening of
such plnces, Chinn will undoubtedly bear In mind the object
of atrording tacilltles to international trade and formulate
them according to established precedents of self-opened ports
and sees, therefore, no necessity In this matter tor any pre·
vlons negotia tiona.
(3) The joint operation of the Shantung Railway, that Is,
the Klaochow-Tslnnn Line, by China and .Japan is objected
to by the entire Chinese people. It Is because in all countries there ought to he a unified system for railways, and
joint operation destroys unity of railway management and
impairs the rights of sovereignty; and, in view of the evils
of the previous cases of joint operation and t'he impossibility of correcting them, China can now no longer recognize It as a mo tter of principle. The whole line of the
Shantung railway, together with the right of control and
management thereof should be completely handed over to
China; and after a just valuation of Its capital and properties one half of the whole value of the line not returned shall
be purchased back .by China within a fixed period. As to the
mines appurtenant to the Shantung Railway which were already operated by the Germans, their plan of operation shall
be fixed In accordance with the Chinese Mining Laws.
(5) With reference to the construction of the extension
of the Shantung Railway, that Is, the Tslnan-Shunteh and
Klachow-Hsnchow Lines, China wiJI, as a matter of course,
negotiate with International financial bodies. As t() the
Chefoo- Welhsien Railway, it is entirely a dtrerent case, and
cannot be discussed in the same category.
(6) The Custom House at Tsintao was formerly situated

reside and to carry on commerce, industry, agriculture or
any othet; lawful pursuits within such territory," the pursuit
of agriculture being specifiically mentioned which was generally considered as an occupation, open to the citizens or
natives only. Third, China undertook "to respect the vested
interests and rights of all foreigners, regardless of the
validity of acquisition. Fourth, she would likewise "carry
out forthwith the opening of suitable cities and towns within
the province of Shantung for residence and trade of the
nationals of all foreign countries," which was one of the stipulations of the treaty of May 25, 1915. Fifth, regulations for
the opening of places under the foregoing clauses should be
In a leased territory, and the system of administration differed slightly from others. When the leased territory is
restored, the Custom House thereat should be placed under
the complete control and Dilanngement of the Chinese Government and should not be dlfterent from the other Custom
Houses In its system of administration.
(7) The extent of public properties Is too wide to be
limited only to that portion used for administrative purposes.
The meaning of the statement In the Japanese memorandum
that such property will in principle be transferred to China,
etc., rather lacks clearness. If It Is the sincere wish of
Japan to return all the public properties to China, she ought
to band over completely the various kinds of official, semiofficial, municipal and other public properties and entei'
prises to China to be distributed, according to their nature
and kind, to the administrations of the central and local
authorities, to the municipal council and to the Chinese Customs, etc., as the case may be. Regarding this there Is no
necessity for any special arrangement, and
(9) The question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops
from the Province of Shantung bears no connection with the
restoration of the Kinocbow Leased Territory and the Chinese
Government has repeatedly urged for Its actual execution. It
Is only proper that the entire Japanese .A:rmy of Occupation
should now be immediately evacuated. As to the policing of
the Kiaochow-Tslnan Railway, China will Immediately send
a suitable force of Chinese Railway Pollee to take over the
duties. The foregoing statement gives only the main points
which are unsatisfactory and concerning which the Chinese
Government feels it •absolutely necessary to make a clear
declaration. Furt'her, In view of the marked dillerence of
opinion between the two countries, and apprehending that
the case might long remain unsettled, China reserves to herselt the freedom of seeking a solution of the question whenever a suitable occasion presents Itself.
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determined by the C:hinese Government with the Powers
interested.
In reply, China welcomed the surrender of the claim to an
exclusive settlement or an international concession and also
pointed out that inasmuch as China had on .previous occasions declared her intention to open Kiaochow as a commercial port for the convenience of trade and residence of the
nationals of all friendly nations, there could be "no necessity
for the establishment of any purely foreign settlement
again." She objected particularly to the inclusion of agriculture among the pursuits allowed to foreigners.
"Agricultural pursuits concern the fundamental means
of existence of the people of a country; and according to
the usual practice of all countries, no foreigners are permitted to engage in them."
She declined to concede indiscriminate recognition to all
vested interest and rights of foreigners, but pointed out the
difference between those legitimately acquired under the German regime and those illegally possessed during the Japanese
military occupation.
"The vested rights of foreigners obtained through lawful
processes under the German regime shall of course be
respected but those obtained by force and compulsion during the period of Japanese military occupation and against
law and treaties can in no wise be recognized."
She also objected to the idea of being called upon to open
cities and towns in Shantung as commercial ports and dedared that "the opening of such places should nevertheless
l'e left to China's own judgment and selection in accordance
with circumstances," plainly maintaining her own full sovereignty. She further declined to enter into previous negotiations as to the regulations governing the opening of such
places, thus again asserting the principle of sovereignty, although conceding that China would "undoubtedly bear in
mind the object of affording facilities to international trade
and formulate them according to established precedents of
self-opened ports."
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In the third proposal, ' the joint enterprise was proposed of
the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railroad, as stipulated in the Agreer'lent of September 24, 1918, respecting the control of the
K:aochow Railway, and also of the mines appurtenant thereto.
To this China strenuously objected on the ground not only
of the illegal acquisition in consequence of the violation of
China's neutrality and sovereignty, but also of the undesirability of the foreign control of railways and the necessity of
unification and nationalization of the same.
"The joint operation of the Shantung railways, that is,
the Kiao Chow-Tsinanfu Line, by China and Japan is objected to by the entire Chinese people. It is because in
all countries there ought to be a unified system for railways, and the joint operation destroys unity of railway
management and impairs the rights of sovereignty; and,
in view of the evils of the previous cases of joint operation
and the impossibility of correcting them, China can now
no longer recognize it as a matter of principle. The whole
line of the Shantung railway, together with the right of
control and management thereof should be completely
handed over to China: and after a just valuation of its
capital and properties one-half of the whole value of the
line not returned shall be purchased back by China within
a fixed period. As to the mines appurtenant to the Shantung railway which were already operated by the Germans,
their plan of operation shall be fixed in accordance with
the Chinese Mining Laws."
The fourth proposal offered to renunciate the preferential
rights with regard to foreign assistance in persons, capital and
material, as stipulated in the Sino-German Treaty of March
6, 1898. This would eliminate the wall of preferential claims
and thus open Shantung to the enterprise of all foreigners,
indicating the desire of the Japanese to maintain equality of
commercial opportunities. To this favorable proposal China
was not opposed, and hence she made no reply thereto. Upon
a closer examination, however, this apparent renunciation is
tantamount to a surrender of something which Japan has not
acquired. Maintaining as we do that the Kiaochow Lease
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Convention of March 6, 1898, which embodied the preferential clause, was abrogated by China's declaration of war
against Germany, it is but plain that the German rights of
preference were nullified upon the declaration of hostility.
While Japan might claim that the treaty of peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, awarded her the German rights in
Shantung, it is to be maintained that China did not sign that
treaty and thus refused to recognize the validity of the
award~ While voluntary renunciation on the part of Japan
might be commendable, her proposal did not harmonize with
the fundamental conviction and principle of the Chinese.
In the fifth proposal, the extensions of the KiaochowTsinanfu Railway, as provided in the agreement of May 24,
1918 (respecting the construction of the Tsinan-Shunteh and
Kaomi-Shuchow Railways) and the options for the construction of the Chefoo Weihsien Railway as stipulated in the
Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting Shantung, were to be
thrown open for the common activity of the international
financial consortium. Inasmuch as the exchange of letters
between Thomas W. Lamont and N. Kajiwara on May 11,
1920, and the Japanese entrance into the New International
Banking Consortium placed these railway concessions within
the scope of the New Consortium, this proposal was deemed
as a mere statement of a situation already in existence. The
reply was therefore made:
"With reference to the construction of the extension c f
the Shantung Railway, that is, the Tsinan-Shunteh ar.d
Kiao Chou-Hsuchou Lines, China will, as a matter of
course, negotiate with international financial bodies."
But as the Chefoo-W eihsien Railway concession was exacted under duress by the treaty of May 25, 1915, which
should be either abrogated or revised, the suggestion thereabout was deemed to be "entirely a different case'' and could
not "be discussed in the same category."
The sixth proposal tendered to make the status of the customs house at Tsingtao as forming an integral part, of the
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general customs system of China clearer than under the
German regime. Inasmuch as the full control of the customs house at Tsingta6 was considered as a natural consequence of the restoration of Kiaochow Leased Territory,
China contended that the status of the Tsingtao customs
house should be the same as that of any other Chinese customs house.
"When the leased territory is restored, the custom house
thereat should be placed under the complete control and
management of the Chinese Government and should not bf'
different from the other custom houses in its system of
administration."
In the seventh proposal, public property used for administrative purposes within the leased territory of Kiaochow was
tendered to be transferred to China, but as to the maintenance
and operation of public works and establishments, special arrangement was to be made between the Japanese and Chinese
governments. This . proposal volunteered the tran!Jer of public property used for administrative purposes, but still insi~ted on previous negotiation or special arrangement for the
d1sposal of public works and establishments, which constituted one of the four conditions attached to the Japanese
pledges of restoration of Kiao Chou as embodied in the exchange of notes, May 25, 1915. Inasmuch as all public
properties, either for administrative purposes or otherwi~e,
should be returned with the restoration of the leased territory without special arrangements, the proposal was therefore rejected :
"The extent of public properties is too wide to be limited
only to that portion used for administrative purposes. If
it is the sincere wish of Japan to return all the public properties to China, she ought to hand over completely the
various kinds of official, semi-official, municipal and other
public properties and enterprises to China to be distributed
according to their nature and kind, to the administrations
of the central and local authorities. to the tnunicipal council and to the Chinese customs, etc., as the case may be.
Regarding this th(·rr is no necessity for any special
arrangement."
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The eighth item proposed the ap[>ointment oi representative commissioners by the Chinese and Japanese governments
to arrange detailed plans "for carrying into effect the terms
of settlement above indicated and for the purpose of adjusting other matters not embodied therein." To this suggestion
China made no reply.
The ninth and last term of settlement tendered the withdrawal of Japanese troops along the Kiao Chou-Tsinan fu
Railway upon the organization by China of a police force to
take over the protection of the line. This offer was, however,
accompanied by the reservation that the question of the
organization of a special police guarding the railway should
be reserved for future consideration between Japan and
China. This exception signified that Japan still held on to
the claim of establishing a police force trained and controlled
by the Japanese, as stipulated in Article 4 of the Agreement
of September 24, 1918, respecting control of the Kiao
Chou-Tsinanfu Railway. As this proposal was tantamount
to the original claim of a police force trained and controlled
by the Japanese and as the agreement in question of September 24, 1918, was considered invalid or voidable, and since
the presence of Japanese troops infringes upon her sovereignty,
China could not but decline the offer.
"The question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops of
Shantung province bears no connection with the restoration
of the Kiao Chou Leased Territory and the Chinese Government has urged repeatedly for its actual execution. It
is only proper that the entire Japanese Army of Occupation
should now be immediately evacuated. As to the policing
of the Kiao Chou-Tsinan Railway, China will immediately
send a suitable force of Chinese railway police to take over
the duties."
From the above terms of settlement as offered by Japan,
it can be seen that what Japan tendered to surrender was not
hers by right, but rather what she should have given up.
Inasmuch as the Kiao Chou Leased Convention of March 6,
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1898, is regarded as abrogated with the declaration of war,
the Kiao Chou Leasehold and the German preferential rights
have therewith been nullified. As the exchange of letters
between Thomas W. Lamont and N. Kajiwara on May 11,
1920, placed the extensions of the Shantung Railway within
the scope of the New International Banking Consortium, the
railways in question should have become open to the common
activities of the New Consortium. The only term of settlement that might be commended and regarded with favor is
the offer to surrender the claim to an exclusive Japanese
settlement or an international concession, but this is offset
by a requirement to recognize all vested interests and rights
acquired during the Japanese military occupation, legitimate
or illegitimate.
On the other hand it is also plain that Japan did not propose to surrender any vital interests, or to meet any fundamental objection of the Chinese. She still insisted on the
joint enterprise of the Kiao Chou-Tsinanfu Railway, future
negotiation regarding the organization of the railway police,
special arrangement for the disposal of public works and
establshments, clearer definition of the status of the customs
house at Tsing Tao, and the recognition of vested interests
acquired by foreigners legitimately or otherwise. In short,
Japan still aims to achieve economic domination in Shantung.
She made no confession of her mistake or crime in landing
her troops at Lungkow and then marching through the Chinese territory and seizing the Kiao Chou-Tsiananfu Railway
and the adjoining mines, and thus failed to recognize and
respect the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of China.
She still ignored the basic contention of the Chinese that
China's declaration of war abrogated all the treaties, conventions and agreements with Germany, inclusive of the Kiao Chou
Leasehold and that China thus recovered to herself all the
former German concessions. She further failed to concede
that her possession of German rights in Shantung was vali-
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dated, neither by the treaty of May 25, 1915, which was
concluded under duress, nor by the Agreement of September
24, 1918, respecting control of the Kiao-Chou- Tsinanfu
Railway, which was entered upon for illegal consideration,
nor by the Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, to
which China was not a contracting party.
The Chinese government therefore prefaced the reply with
a· declaration of disappointment over the terms of settlement
and failure of Japan to meet the fundamental contentions
and objections of the Chinese:
"With reference to the important Shantung Question
which is now pending between China and Japan, China has
indeed been most desirous of any early settlement for the
restitution of her sovereign rights and territory. The
reason why China has not until now been able to commence
negotiations with Japan is because of the fact that the
basis upon which Japan claims to negotiate are all of a
nature either highly objectionable to the Chinese Government and the Chinese people, or such to which- they
have never given their recognition. Furthermore, in regard
to the Shantung Question, although Japan has made many
vague declarations she has in fact had no plan which is
fundamentally acceptable. Therefore the case has been
pending for many years much to the unexpectation of China.
On September 7 Japan submitted certain proposals for the
readjustment of the Shantung Question in the form of a
memorandum together with a verbal statement by the
Japanese Minister to the effect that inview of the great
principle of Sino-Japanese friendship Japan has decided
upon this fair and just plan as her final concession, etc.
After careful consideration the Chinese Government feels
that much in Japan's new proposals is still incompatible
with the repeated declarations of the Chinese Government,
with the hopes and expectations of the entire Chinese people, and with the principles laid down in treaties between
China and the foreign powers. If these proposals are to be
considered the final concession on the part of Japan, they
surely fall short to prove the sincerity of Japan's desire to
settle the question."
Consequent to the rejection of the terms of settlement, and
anxious to reach a solution of the Shantung Question at an

46

early date, the Chinese Government made the reservation
at the conclusion of the reply "of seeking a solution of the
question whenever a suitable occasion presents itself," apparently giving the hint that, with concurrence of the powers
interested, the Shantung Question might be made a subject
for discussion in the Washington Conference on Limitation
of Armament and Far Eastern Problems.
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Additional copies may be obtained upon request
from Y. Lewis Mason, Circulation Manager,
5800 Maryla.nd Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

